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On June 28, 1990, Lotus Development Corporation prevailed in a
federal district court suit against Paperback Software International
claiming copyright violation of Lotus' computer program known as "Lo-
tus 1-2-3" (1-2-3).' 1-2-3 is generally regarded in the business world as
the industry standard "electronic spreadsheet" program used to perform
mathematical and financial calculations on IBM compatible personal
computers. Defendant's product, known as "VP-Planner," looked and
performed so much like Lotus' product that defendant advertised it as
follows:
VP-Planner is designed to work like Lotus 1-2-3, keystroke for keys-
troke .... VP-Planner's worksheet is a feature for feature workalike for
1-2-3. It does macros. It has the same command tree. It does the same
kind of calculations, the same kind of numerical information. Everything
1-2-3 does, VP-Planner does.2
An interesting feature of the Lotus decision was that the defendant,
Paperback Software International, acknowledged that they had at-
tempted to intentionally duplicate the "user interface ' 3 of the 1-2-3
software manufactured by the plaintiff, and that they had in fact suc-
ceeded in doing so. VP-Planner consisted of completely new and original
computer instructions (i.e., the "literal elements" of the program),
which caused the computer screen to precisely mimic 1-2-3's well-known
"user interface." Lotus' user interface consists of a tree of menu com-
mands by which users tell 1-2-3 what to do. It also includes long
prompts which explain each command to the users. These features of the
* J.D. Candidate, SUNY at Buffalo Law School, May 1992.
1. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
2. Id. at 69 (citing VP-Planner Manual at xi, 1.11).
3. The user interface or screen displays in dispute in the Lotus case, (the "non-literal" elements)
of the program, are distinct from the "literal" elements of a program, which have been held to be
copyrightable. The protected literal elements of a program are constituted by the text of the pro-
gram which the user does not see and which results in the screen displays familiar to users.
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1-2-3 program appeared to the users of the defendant's VP-Planner and
were the subject of the infringement action.
Neither party disputed the well-established principle that the literal
elements of a computer program are copyrightable, provided that such
computer instructions first meet the federal copyright law's test of origi-
nality.4  The only meaningful dispute between the parties to the Lotus
suit was whether the defendant's duplication of the non-literal elements
of 1-2-3 actually violated the federal copyright law. The defendant Pa-
perback Software asserted that 1-2-3, the industry-standard electronic
spreadsheet, represented an uncopyrightable "idea" rather than the
copyrightable expression thereof. Paperback was of the opinion that in
developing VP-Planner they were merely "standing on the shoulders of
giants," engaging in the favored practice of building upon earlier pro-
gress and innovation.5
Lotus Development Corporation appealed to the district court for a
determination that its shoulders were in fact not very broad, and incapa-
ble of supporting Paperback's weight. Lotus acknowledged that the
"idea" of an electronic spreadsheet was not protected by the copyright
laws and that the defendant had the legal right to develop and market an
electronic spreadsheet. However, the plaintiff argued that its 1-2-3 ver-
sion of the electronic spreadsheet went "beyond the details essential to
any expression of the idea, and include[d] substantial elements of expres-
sion, distinctive and original, which [were] copyrightable."
'6
Normally, where the facts of a case are not in dispute, there is no
need for a court to engage in legislative behavior in applying the law to
the facts, and the court may definitively dispose of the case. However,
where the law to be applied is not clearly defined, and the milieu in which
it is applied is equally murky, as in the case of the applicability of copy-
right concepts to computer programs, the temptation exists for courts to
engage in judicial law-making.
An opportunity to legislate presented itself to the district court hear-
ing the Lotus case. However, Judge Keeton of the District Court of Mas-
sachusetts declined the invitation for judicial activism and merely steered
between the "markers" which Congress had placed to aid courts in deal-
ing with the copyright problems associated with evolving technology.
4. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 45 (citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer, Corp., 714
F.2d 1240, 1243 (3rd Cir. 1983) cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Stem Electronics, Inc, v.
Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982)); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1990).
5. Id. at 77.
6. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 65 (D. Mass. 1990).
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After completing a thorough evaluation of the legislative intent underly-
ing the copyright laws, Judge Keeton decided that some of the non-literal
elements of 1-2-3 were original literary works which were to be protected
from unauthorized duplication, such as that represented by VP-Planner.
Obviously, the software industry viewed Judge Keeton's Lotus decision
with great interest, as this landmark case involved one of the biggest and
most respected names in the software field. Both parties to this dispute
desired a bright-line determination as to the scope of copyright protec-
tion of the non-literal elements of computer programs. Judge Keeton's
admittedly ad hoc decision was bound to disappoint both camps; its re-
fusal to draw a bright line rule as desired by both sides means that the
debate is not much more settled than when it began. So while the deci-
sion will no doubt be much-studied in the future, the present state of the
law remains uncertain.
II. COMPUTER PROGRAMS & COPYRIGHT
Copyright is a limited privilege of protection which the government
offers to authors in order to encourage them to produce original works.
The underlying rationale is that society benefits from the proliferation of
intellectual work. Since copying is far less expensive than creation, copy-
right law rewards writers for their sweat of the brow, and deters those
who steal other's work. As the Supreme Court has stated, "[s]acrificial
days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate
with the services rendered."
'7
A. What Is a Copyright?
A copyright protects exactly one thing - the expression of an idea.
The idea itself is not copyrightable, for granting ownership of an idea to a
single individual is antithetical to our concept that ideas cannot belong to
individuals' (although an application of an idea may be patentable, as is
discussed in Part IV).' According to the 1976 Copyright Act, any "origi-
7. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
8. "If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is
the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long
as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every
one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it." Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 n.2
(1966) (citing VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 180-81 (Washington ed.)).
9. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, or embodied in such work." Copyright Act of 1976
§ 102(b), 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
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nal works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed" can be copyrighted."
A copyright is not a grant of a single right, rather it is a grant of a
"bundle of rights" which protect an author's expression of an idea.I
1
Each right in the bundle is distinct, and like other property rights, each
can be sold or leased separately.12 The Copyright Act defines those
rights as granting to the copyright holder:
(1) The exclusive right to make copies of the work;
(2) The exclusive right to prepare derivative works (works based
upon the original work);
(3) The exclusive right to market or distribute the work;
(4) The exclusive right to perform the work publicly; and
(5) The exclusive right to display the work in a commercial
setting. 3
To this list, can be added another right implied by the statute, since
Congress' overall policy is to grant the copyright holder:
(6) The underlying right to make money from the product. 14
These protections extend for the life of the last surviving author of a
work (if multiple authors) plus 50 years.15 When the author can not be
identified (e.g., anonymous authors or those using fictitious names) or
when the author creates "made-for-hire" work (e.g., for a corporation)
then the copyright protection extends to the lesser of either 75 years from
the date of publication or 100 years from the time fixed in a tangible
medium. 
16
B. Can a Computer Program Be Copyrighted?
Computer programs can be classified as "literary works,"17 within
10. Copyright Act of 1976 § 102(a), 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. 1990).
11. M.". SALONE, How TO COPYRIGHT SO1VrWARE ch.3, at 4 (Stephen Elias ed., 1989).
12. The purchaser of copyrighted software also has rights under 17 U.S.C. §§ 17 and 117.
When one buys software, one owns it and can do anything one wants to it, limited by manufacturer's
license or warranty. One can reverse-engineer the work to discover how it functions. One can create
adaptations (or derivative works) from the software for one's own use. However, one may not sell or
give away such derivatives or adaptations of the software. Furthermore, one may not copy, dis-
tribute, or display the adaptation for any commercial purpose. Id. at ch.4, p:13 -14 .
13. Copyright Act of 1976 § 106, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
14. SALONE, supra note 11, ch.3, at 4.
15. Copyright Act of 1976 § 302(a), 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988).
16. Copyright Act of 1976 § 302(c), 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1988).
17. Section 101, the definitional section of the Copyright Act of 1976, states that "Literary
works are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or
numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manu-
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the subject matter protectable by copyright.18 "[A]t least some but
clearly not all, aspects of computer programs, if original, are works of
authorship in which copyright can subsist."19 A series of copyright suits
has upheld this view.2° Congress indicated its desire to afford copyright
protection to computer programs by expressly defining the term "com-
puter program" as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly
or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.
'21
From the very instant these instructions are recorded in a tangible me-
dium, they are automatically copyrighted. A writing is "fixed" when it
written or typed on paper, or stored on a computer disk, or contained in
any other firm manner which can be retrieved. Contrarily, the thoughts
in one's mind are never fixed and are not copyrightable "[n]o matter how
long they've been there or how inflexible you are when it comes time to
change them.",
22
It is no longer necessary to register a computer program with the
Copyright Office in order to receive copyright protection. In 1989 at the
Berne Convention,23 the United States agreed to bring its copyright
scripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied." Copyright Act of
1976 § 101, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (emphasis added).
18. Section 102 of the Copyright Act of 1976 defines the "Subject matter of copyright" as works
of authorship in the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
Copyright Act of 1976 § 102, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. 1990).
19. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 53 (D. Mass. 1990).
20. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir.
1982); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982); Digital Comm. Assocs., Inc. v.
Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Manage-
ment Assistance, Inc., 219 USPQ 450 (D. Id. 1983); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741
(N.D. I1. 1983); GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718 (BNA) (N.D. Cal. 1982).
21. Copyright Act of 1976 § 101, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1990).
22. SALONE, supra note 11, ch.3, at 5-6.
23. "The Berne Convention is the Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, signed at Berne, Switzerland, on September, 9, 1886, [sic] and all acts, protocols and revi-
sions thereto." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (West Supp. 1990). The Berne Convention, which provides for the
international protection of copyrightable works, entered into force in the United States on March 1,
1989, the effective date of The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-568, 102
Stat. 2853. Section 411 of Title 17 was altered by the adoption of the Berne Convention, as is evident
from the change of the title of the section from "Registration as prerequisite to infringement suit" to
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scheme closer to that of Europe by removing some of the formalities nec-
essary to attain protection, including requirements of strict copyright no-
tice and registration. By this scheme, an author acquires copyright
protection from the instant she saves her work onto a diskette.24 The
removal of the notice and registration requirements is especially impor-
tant to computer programmers as their works often require frequent revi-
sion and updating, for which repetitive registration would become
expensive and burdensome. Nonetheless, software authors are well ad-
vised to regularly register their work. The United States hedged on its
accession to the European concept of copyright protection by making
registration a required precursor to the filing of infringement suits under
the Copyright Act.25 As an added incentive for registration, the Act dis-
allows any recovery of attorney's fees or statutory damages for any such
infringement which takes place before registration (unless the registra-
tion is within three months after the first publication of the work).26
There may be a loophole to the application of these registration re-
quirements to computer programs. Copyright Act section 411 (b) states
that an infringement suit may be commenced without registration either
before or after transmission of works consisting of "sounds, images, or
both, the first fixation of which is made simultaneously with its transmis-
sion."'27 "Transmission" is defined as communicating a display "by any
device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the
place from which they are sent."2 Since many programs produce images
and sounds, and increasing numbers of them transmit these images and
sounds across telephone wires, it may be possible for the sounds and
images produced by an unregistered text to fall within full copyright pro-
tection though the text itself would not enjoy copyright protection.29
"Registration and infringement actions." Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,
§ 9(b)(1)(B), Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 411 (Supp. 1990)). How-
ever the first sentence of present § 411 (a) still states that unless an action is one for infringement of
copyright in Berne Convention works whose country of origin is not the United States, no action for
infringement of such copyright shall be instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been
made in accordance with sections 408, 409 and 410 of Title 17. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (Supp. 1990).
24. According to section 101 of the Copyright Law of 1976, "a 'work' is fixed in a tangible
medium of expresgion when its embodiment in a copy.., by or under the authority of the author, is
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated
for a period of more than transitory duration." Copyright Act of 1976 § 101, 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1988).
25. Copyright Act of 1976 § 411(a), 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1988).
26. Copyright Act of 1976 § 412, 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1988).
27. Copyright Act of 1976 § 411(b), 17 U.S.C. § 411(b) (1988).
28. Copyright Act of 1976 § 101, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
29. How far does an image have to be sent in order to be "transmitted"? Can an image or sound
[Vol. 40
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C. Duality of the Nature of Written Computer Programs
The text of many computer programs is so individually distinctive
that it should qualify as an "original work of authorship" in itself.30 As
a form of expressive writing, computer programs share many stylistic
characteristics found in other forms of writing. Just as in narrative forms
of writing, programs take on stylistic attributes of their authors. The
manner of word choice found in an unsigned work of a prolific program-
mer can reveal the author's identity as clearly as would a passage ran-
domly selected from Shakespeare or a stray brush stroke culled from Van
Gogh. Such distinctiveness and originality is far from accidental. The
best writers espouse clearly defined individual philosophies of program
writing, such that their word choices and text structures will meet high
standards of clarity and functionality. 31 As expressed by professional
programmer Arthur Fuller:
A Word on Coding Style... I admit to an occasional wisp of black humor
in the naming of variables and functions. If your standards differ, excellent,
I'm not here to convert you. Go all through the source with your text-
editor and change those things that offend you. On the other hand, if you
have no standards, you need some. You might as well begin with these.32
Moreover, computer programs have a particular attribute making
them inherently different from other literary genres. Unlike other forms
of authorship, computer programs do not merely consist of static words.
stored on a diskette be "sent' to a computer monitor several feet away and qualify as "transmis-
sion"? What about sending that image to a monitor in the next room, in the next building, or in the
next state? Subtleties such as. these are likely to be issues that will be tested in the field of software
copyright in the coming years.
30. "Original work of authorship" is not a defined term in the statute, but appears in section 102
of Title 17, entitled "Subject matter of copyright". Copyright Act of 1976 § 102, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1988). The fact that there is no statutory definition of an original work of authorship raises one of
the most fundamental problems in the application of the traditional notions of copyright protection
to short-lived computer programs. Litigation in the copyright area often focuses upon the character-
ization of a program as merely a derivative work as opposed to being an original work of authorship.
This problem is the crux of the Lotus controversy, as the district court was faced with deciding
whether VP-Planner was a "merely trivial" variation of 1-2-3, or something which was to be re-
garded as recognizably the defendant's own work. Cf. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486
(2d Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976).
31. "One of the most important elements of this book is the discussion ofprogrammingphiloso-
phy." PETER NORTON & RICHARD WILTON, THE NEW PETER NORTON PROGRAMMER'S GUIDE
TO THE IBM PC & PS/2 at vii (1988). See also PETER NORTON, INSIDE THE IBM PC (1986) (for a
discussion on the philosophy of DOS, computer hardware, and software in general).
32. ARTHUR FULLER, DYNAMIcS OF CLIPPER at xxx (1989). This book discusses computer
program writing from the viewpoint that programming philosophy is as important as the program
itself. Fuller introduced the concept of invisible software which means that a user achieves his or her
goals without being aware that they are using a program. Id. at 1-5.
1992]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
When electricity is applied, these words perform, they take action, the
words interact, and react in real time with human beings and machines
alike. A program's words exist in a static ink form, as well as in a kinetic
active form. This self-actuation distinguishes computer literature from
conventional writing.
A duality of expression exists with computer programs. Not only is
the text of the program characteristically expressive in the way it is writ-
ten, but what the text does attains its own expressiveness. A program's
literal words, the commands written by the programmer in a language
understandable by the computer, are made purposefully invisible to the
user. This is because the average user only is interested in the non-literal
elements expressed by a program: the on-screen displays with which he
or she can interact to perform desired tasks. Non-literal program expres-
sions often have a style characteristic of their creator. For example, pro-
grams written by Peter Norton (e.g., Norton's Utilities) are well known
for their powerful, user-friendliness in performing different systems-
maintenance tasks. A single isolated program from this series might be
identifiable as a "Norton" merely from its manner of display screens and
method of operation. This non-literal form of expressiveness in a pro-
gram is the heart of the Lotus case.
D. Judicial Acceptance of the Notion of Duality of Expression
For a number of years, the Copyright Office accepted the notion
that a program's text and its actions (visual and audio output) were sepa-
rate forms of expression, each of which was entitled to its own separate
copyright registration. Today, the Copyright Office only accepts a single
registration for a single computer program. This new policy is not so
much a rejection of the dual expression notion as it is a matter of reduc-
ing duplicative paperwork, presuming that an applicant is registering
both attributes of her program.
The twin modes of expression contained in computer programs, de-
fined in the previous section as the "literal" and the "non-literal" ele-
ments, have been recognized by courts addressing the issue of software
copyrightability.33 The issues of the Lotus case primarily concerned the
"non-literal" elements of 1-2-3. Frustrating the court's task was the fact
33. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) (expanding copyright protection to include expressions of computer
programs which do not even make sense to humans, reasoning that computer-readable "object code"
is merely a different form of expression of the same copyrightable program which can be understood
by humans in "source code").
[Vol. 40
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that Congress has not explicitly addressed the copyrightability of the
non-literal elements of computer programs, such as a program's overall
organization, the structure of its command system, and its presentation
of information on the screen. Congress has only spoken with regard to
the literal expressions of computer programs, and has not even recog-
nized the distinctiveness of the non-literal expression.34
In the absence of a uniform legislative pronouncement regarding the
non-literal elements of computer programs, courts have been delegated
the task of interpreting Congress' silence. The Lotus decision demon-
strates the difficulties the federal judiciary will encounter in attempting to
divine whether Congress intended to extend copyright protection to a
program's non-literal elements, and if so, to what extent. Clearly, Con-
gress has designated literary works as copyrightable works of authorship,
providing a basis of copyright protection of the literal expressions of
computer programs. Additionally, by federal statute, music, pictorial,
graphic, and audiovisual works are all protected as copyrightable
works.35 Building upon these protections, courts have been able to find
that non-literal computer expressions, which are frequently expressed
graphically/audibly, are entitled to the protections commonly afforded to
more traditional literary works. Given that the list of types of copyright-
able works as set out in section 102 of the 1988 Amendments to the
Copyright Act is meant to be suggestive rather than exhaustive, courts
are empowered to grant copyright protection for non-literal computer
expression. In fact, although the disputed non-literal program expression
is not included in section 102's list of copyrightable works, Congress has
recognized the need to periodically update the list as technology
warrants.36
The "Writings Clause" of the Constitution granted Congress the ex-
clusive prerogative to decide which policies best promote the progress of
arts and sciences.
The Congress shall have the power to promote the Progress of Science and
the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
34. See supra note 21. The previously cited statutory definition of "computer program" found
in § 101 of Title 17, indicates that Congress contemplated granting copyright protection only to the
"set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly to bring about the desired result"
(the literal elements) and not to the desired result itself (the non-literal elements).
35. Copyright Act of 1976 § 102, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
36. The legislative history of § 102 of the Copyright Act of 1976 and its subsequent amend-




exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
37
Congress alon6 may meet that goal by granting any level of copyright
monopoly; expansive, restrictive, or any level in between .3  The authori-
zation of the Writings Clause enabled Congress to formulate the statu-
tory scheme now codified in Title 17 of the U.S. Code.
The Constitutional directive of the Writings Clause has origins
which pre-date the country's birth. The Constitutional scheme was in
part a reaction to the development and abuses of the monopoly system by
the British Crown.39 In addition, the Writings Clause reflects the desire
to protect intellectual property and to encourage academic pursuits un-
fettered by considerations of favoritism or privilege.
Periodically, as technology has introduced new media of expression,
Congress has amended the Copyright Act to bring it sufficiently up-to-
date to fulfill the intent of the Writings Clause. In 1974, Congress recog-
nized that new computer technology was quickly outstripping the then-
current level of copyright protection. Lawsuits were testing the bounda-
ries of a copyright law not designed to accommodate new methods of
storing and retrieving information.
In response, Congress created the Commission on New Technologi-
cal Uses of Copyrighted Works ("CONTU") to study the use and repro-
duction of copyrighted works utilizing automatic storage and retrieval.
CONTU's responsibility was to make recommendations to Congress re-
garding desirable copyright law revisions.' CONTU found that the
need to protect the form of expression embodied in computer programs
was growing in proportion to two related trends: computers were becom-
ing less expensive, while at the same time programs were increasingly
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
38. Judge Keeton, author of the Lotus decision, recognized that because of the broad mandate
given to Congress in the copyright field:
If Congress were to determine, for example, that copyright protection is unnecessary to
"promote the Progress of" computer programming... then Congress could, without
offending the Constitution, provide no copyright protection for computer programs. At
the other extreme, were Congress to find that strong copyright protection is necessary to
promote the progress of computer programming, Congress could provide for expansive
copyright protection for all aspects of computer programs, again without having strayed
beyond the bounds of the constitutionally permissible.
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 46 (D. Mass. 1990).
39. The Supreme Court in Graham noted that the crown was in the habit of "granting monopo-
lies to court favorites in goods or businesses which had long before been enjoyed by the public."
Graham v. John Deere Corp., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966). See also A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness:
Invention Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1097, 1108 (1989).
40. Act of Dec 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93,573, § 201(b)-(c), 88 Stat. 1873, 1873-74.
292 [Vol. 40
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being written to operate on more than single-purpose machines."
CONTU suggested that Congress amend the copyright law to explicitly
make computer programs copyrightable to the extent that they repre-
sented an author's original creation.42
In 1980, Congress accepted CONTU's recommendations and
amended the Copyright Act almost verbatim from the CONTU report's
proposed statutory changes.43 The Lotus court concluded that congres-
sional intent was expressed by its adoption of CONTU's findings. The
court fashioned a legal test of copyrightability consistent with those find-
ings.' The court found that Congress intended that the idea/expression
distinction should be used to determine which aspects of computer pro-
grams are copyrightable.45
III. LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. PAPERBACK
SOFT WARE INTERNATIONAL
A. Background
Judge Keeton began the Lotus opinion with a recognition that "[t]he
expression of an idea is copyrightable" while "[t]he idea itself is not."46
In the lengthy fifty page opinion that was to follow, the judge struggled
to resolve the clash between these two settled rules of law in an attempt
to distinguish the idea of an unprotected electronic spreadsheet from pro-
tected expressions of that idea. Keeton sought instruction from the
Supreme Court, which in Kelly v. Robinson,47 set out the sources of gui-
dance which a judge should consult in an attempt to determine statutory
meaning and Congressional intent.48
Applying Kelly to the problem of the copyrightability of the non-
41. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FI-
NAL REPORT 10 (1978), reprinted in NICHOLAS HENRY, 5 COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS AND TECHNOL-
OGY: THE PUBLIC RECORD 18 (1980) [hereinafter CONGRESS AND TECHNOLOGY].
42. CONGRESS AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 41, at 2. Congress also enacted CONTU's rec-
ommendation that rightful possessors of computer software be allowed to make archival copies of
the programs and be permitted to make adaptations of the software for their own purposes only. Id.
43. See Copyright Act of 1976 § 117, 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1980). -
44. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 54 (D. Mass. 1990).
45. Id. at 53-54.
46. Id. at 42.
47. Id. at 46 (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986)).
48. Id. at 46 (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986)). Under Kelly in order to determine
"the manifested meaning of a statute and the manifestations of Congressional intent," the starting
point in every case involving a statute is the language itself. However Justice O'Connor reminded
that the text is only the starting point, and that "in expounding a statute we must ... look to the
provisions of the whole law and to its object and policy." Id. at 46-47, quoting Kelly, 479 U.S. at 43.
1992]
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literal elements of a computer program, Keeton realized that the primary
source of guidance should be the relevant language of the federal copy-
right statute itself. Since the copyright law does not explicitly address
the copyrightability of these non-literal elements, Kelly teaches that
courts are next to look to "provisions of the whole law." '49 The final step
of the Kelly test calls for a court to examine the "object and policy" of
the whole law in issue.50
Before adjudging the merits of the Lotus case, the district court, in
line with Kelly, reflected extensively upon its authority to reach conclu-
sions of law regarding the copyright protections to be afforded to non-
literal elements of computer programs, given the absence of congres-
sional instruction on this matter. Judge Keeton summoned the Writings
Clause as a reminder that the singular, exclusive source of copyright law
in the United States is vested in the legislative branch of the federal gov-
ernment, and is a matter of legislative grace. He cited the Supreme
Court's holding from Banks v. Manchester, Ohio, that "no authority ex-
ists for obtaining a copyright beyond the extent to which Congress has
authorized it."52  With this caveat in mind, Keeton opined that "[t]he
central question here is not whether Congress could render non-literal
elements such as those of 1-2-3 copyrightable, but whether it has done
SO."1
53
Having decided that Congress had not expressly rendered the non-
literal elements of a computer program copyrightable by the federal
copyright statute, Judge Keeton next looked to the provisions of the
whole law for aid. The first relevant aspect of the whole law of copyright
examined by Keeton was an extensive line of case law which has held
that copyright protection in some literary works does extend to the non-
literal elements of protected expression. An example of a non-literal
expression which has been held to be protected as part of a copyrighted
literary work cited by the Lotus court, can be found in Detective Comics,
Inc. v. Bruns Publications, Inc.,54 where the Second Circuit examined an
alleged infringement upon the plaintiff's "Superman" comic book hero.
The defendant introduced a character named "Wonderman" who pos-
sessed superhuman skills remarkably similar to the familiar Superman
attributes. While the Wonderman character was not an exact replica of
49. Id. at 47.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 46.
52. Id. (quoting Banks v. Manchester, Ohio, 128 U.S. 244, 252 (1888)).
53. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 46 (D. Mass 1990).
54. 111 F.2d 432, 433 (2d Cir. 1940).
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Superman, and did not copy the text of the Superman comics, the Second
Circuit still found that the Wonderman character infringed upon Detec-
tive Comics' copyright on its Superman character based upon the non-
literal elements of the Superman comic, such as the skin-tight acrobatic
suits worn by both characters beneath their ordinary clothing, their abil-
ity to leap tall buildings, and their dedication to championing the causes
of the oppressed." The general rule regarding the non-literal expressions
of literary works was well-expressed by Judge Learned Hand in Nichols.
v. Universal Pictures Corp.,56 "the right cannot be limited literally to the
text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations.""
Cases such as Detective Comics, examined by the court in an attempt
to define the protection available to the non-literal elements of 1-2-3, are
often referred to as the "look and feel" cases.5 8 Judge Keeton cited these
cases as examples of courts providing protection to the non-literal expres-
sion of ideas. More recently, Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Com-
pany found that the non-literal elements of expression in a greeting card
could be copyrighted based upon its "total concept and feel."59 This was
reiterated in Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corporation, which held that
McDonald's television commercials copied the "total concept and feel"
of Krofft's H.R. Pufnstuff television series.4 0 In Aliotti v. R. Dakin &
Co., it was noted that although expression is copyrightable, the "total
concept and feel" test should only be applied to the similarities between
two works after eliminating unprotectable expressions.6
The first computer copyright case to follow this chain of "look and
feel" suits was Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., although infringement
was not found in this Karate game video graphics suit. 2 Likewise,
Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corporation found a lack of total
"look and feel" between the display screens of two outline-generator pro-
grams.6" Presumably, the "look and feel" test, as it was applied in Roth
to greeting cards and in Krofft to television commercials, would be an all-
or-nothing test. Applied to computer programs, it would find an entire
55. Id.
56. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
57. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 51.
58. See Ronald Abramson, "Look and Feel" of Computer Software, 95 CASE & COMMENT 3
(Jan.-Feb. 1990).
59. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
60. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th
Cir. 1977).
61. Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
62. Data East USA v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 209 (9th Cir. 1988).
63. Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1991 (BNA) (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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program to be either in infringement or in compliance with copyright
protection.
Observers believed that the Lotus decision would be a further devel-
opment of'the "look and feel" line of cases. Ultimately, the Lotus court
rejected the "look and feel" concept stating that this concept, standing
alone, was not helpful in distinguishing between non-literal elements of a
computer program which are copyrightable and those which are not.r4
* The court recognized that the "total concept and feel" standard has been
applied to non-literal elements of music, drama, film, and literature,6 but
found it inapposite for determining copyrightability in this case. 66
After rejecting the "look and feel" cases such as Detective Comics as
unhelpful in defining the "whole law of copyright" as it applied to the
nonliteral elements of computer programs, Judge Keeton then examined
another line of cases which actually addressed the non-literal elements of
programs in a continuing effort to abide by Kelly. Cases such as Whelan
Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.,67 were addressed in an
effort to counter the assertion by Paperback Software that the copied
elements of 1-2-3 were nothing more than unprotected "useful articles"
as defined under section 101 of the copyright law.
Under section 101 of the copyright law, a "useful article" is one that
has an "intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the
appearance of the article or to convey information.168 Keeton recog-
Snized that "those elements of a useful article that can exist independently
of the utilitarian aspects of the article are potentially copyrightable be-
cause those elements are elements of expression that can be distinguished
from the utilitarian functions of the article."' 69  The court adopted this
argument, finding that although a user interface may be useful, not every
aspect of a user interface is uncopyrightable as "useful." The court built
upon the California holding in NEC v. Intel that "a copyrighted work...
does not lose its protected status merely because it subsequently is put to
functional use." 70 Keeton noted that it would be incongruous to punish
64. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 62 (D. Mass. 1990).
65. See generally Pamela Samuelson & Robert J. Glushko, Comparing the Views of Lawyers and
User Interface Designers on the Software Copyright "Look and Feel" Lawsuits, 30 JURIMETRICS J.
121 (1989); Zecheriah Chaffee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: Part I, 45 COLUM. L. Rev.
503, 513 (1945).
66. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 63.
67. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986) cert. denied 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
68. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 52 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)).
69. Id.
70. NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 645 F. Supp. 590, 595 (N.D. Cal 1986) (functions performed by
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productive creation for the mere fact that it works so well:
It does not follow that when an intellectual work achieves the feat of being
useful as well as expressive and original, the moment of creative triumph is
also a moment of devastating financial loss - because the triumph destroys
copyrightability of all expressive elements which would have been protected
if only they had not contributed so much to the public interest by helping to
make some article useful.7 1
Such an interpretation would only grant copyright protection to products
which fall far short of being the best available, and would create a disin-
centive against developing and disclosing the best.
After setting out the definition of a "useful article" under the copy-
right law, the opinion addressed the defendant's claim that the copied
menu layouts of 1-2-3 were nothing more than utilitarian, useful articles,
similar to the arrangement of letters and symbols found on the standard
QWERTY typewriter keyboard. Judge Keeton rejected the defendant's
proffered analogies and decided that according to the line of case law
engendered by Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.,
that the nonliteral elements of a computer program were not "object[s]
designated to do work, [similar] for example, [to] the cam of a drill."72
Whelan, and the cases which followed it, supported Lotus' contention of
copyrightability for non-literal elements, by holding that "copyright pro-
tection of computer programs may extend beyond the programs' literal
code to their structure, sequence, and organization."73
This structure/sequence/organization reasoning was echoed in
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc. which held that "copy-
right protection is not limited to the literal aspects of a computer pro-
gram, but rather ... it extends to the overall structure of a program,
including its audiovisual displays."'74 SAS Institute Inc. v. S & H Com-
puter Systems held that "copying of the organization and structural de-
tails" can form basis for infringement.7" Manufacturers Technologies,
Inc. v. Phoenix Control Systems found that a program's "screen displays
microprograms do not affect their status as copyrightable subject matter), vacated on grounds of
judge's recusal, 835 F.2d 1546 (9th Cir. 1988).
71. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 57.
72. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 55 (D. Mass. 1990).
73. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1248 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
74. Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
(interpreting Whelan Assocs., Inc., v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987)).




or user interface" are copyrightable. 76 Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix
Control Systems stated that non-literal aspects such as the "structure,
sequence and/or organization of the program, the user interface, and the
function, or purpose, of the program," are copyrightable to the extent
that they consist of expression rather than idea.77 Telemarketing Re-
sources v. Symantec Corp., explained that "[c]opyright protection applies
to the user interface, or overall structure and organization of a computer
program, including its audiovisual displays, or screen look and feel",
although it found no infringement in that particular case.78 Q-Co. Indus-
tries v. Hoffman noted that similarity of "structure and arrangement"
can form basis of infringement suit, but when the structural similarities
are dictated by functional considerations, they represent non-copyright-
able ideas rather than copyrightable expression.79 Pearl Systems v. Com-
petition Electronics held that "[c]opyright protection of computer
software is not limited to the text of the source or object code."80
Several limiting cases have ruled against this line of reasoning. Most
prominently, Digital Communications Associates v. Soft klone Distributing
Corp., expressly rejected the notion that audiovisual screen displays are
separately copyrightable from the underlying program.81 Softklone con-
cluded that copyright protection of a computer program does not extend
to the screen displays generated by that program.82 The Softklone court
explained that it would be illogical to conclude that the same screen can
be a "copy" of many different programs, and therefore, a display screen
generated by a program could not be a direct copy of the literary or
substantive content of the computer program.83 The court went on to
say that "copying a program's screen displays, without evidence of copy-
ing of the program's source code, object code, sequence, organization or
structure, does not state a claim of infringement."84 However, even Soft-
klone found that defendant's Mirror program status screen has captured
76. Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. CAMS, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 993 (D. Conn. 1989).
77. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Systems, Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir.
1989).
78. Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1991, 1993 (BNA) (N.D. Cal.
1989).
79. Q-Co. Industries v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 615-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
80. Pearl Sys., Inc. v. Competition Elec., Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1520, 1524 (BNA) (S.D. Fla. 1988).
81. Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F.Supp. 449, 455-56
(N.D. Ga. 1987). See generally Broderbund Software Inc., v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127
(N.D. Cal. 1986).
82. Digital Communications, 659 F. Supp. at 455.
83. Id. at 455-56.
84. Id. at 456.
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the "total concept and feel" of plaintiff's Crosstalk XVI program status
screen.8 5 Softklone found that copying the arrangement, headings, capi-
talization, and highlighting of plaintiff's work and presenting it as de-
fendant's own work was an infringement of copyright.8 6
B. The Lotus 3-Prong Test of Software Copyrightability
Having completed the Kelly investigation into the language of the
copyright statute, the provisions of the whole law, and the object and
policy of the copyright law, Judge Keeton recognized that there was no
definitive legal test for deciding copyrightability in a factual context such
as that presented by the Lotus case "in either the statute or in the prece-
dents interpreting and applying it.""7 Judge Keeton realized that the ab-
sence of a legal test based upon the statute did not give him license to
legislate one into existence. Instead, he preferred to highlight the "mark-
ers" which Congress had placed to delineate the boundary between
copyrightability and noncopyrightability and to steer between them in
determining whether 1-2-3's nonliteral elements were copyrightable.
Before charting his course based upon the facts of the case before him,
Keeton revealed the touchstone of his views regarding copyright:
Drawing into one statement the fundamental truths about ideas and their
expression... one may accurately say that the issue of copyrightability of a
"work" turns not on whether the work expresses ideas, but instead on
whether, in addition to expressing one or more ideas, in some material re-
spect it does more, and in an original way.38
Believing that an idea cannot be completely abstracted from the ex-
pression thereof, Judge Keeton offered a statement of the three most sig-
nificant elements of the test for legal copyrightability in order to solve the
idea/expression dilemma presented by the Lotus facts.
First, the court postulated that the decisionmaker must focus upon
the "idea" under discussion, and define it "along the scale from the most
generalized conception to the most particularized."9 The court noted
that the mere process of framing the definition of the expression to be
tested for copying, places it somewhere on a flexible continuum from
very specific to very abstract. The exercise of framing the question biases
the outcome of the test, since the more abstract an expression is, the
85. Id. at 465.
86. Id. at 460.
87. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 59 (D. Mass. 1990)
88. Id. at 60.
89. Id. at 60 (quoting Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)).
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more likely it is to be uncopyrightable, while the more specific the ex-
pression is, the more amenable it is to copyright. Because the threshold
determination as to what constitutes an "idea" must be made before the
other tests for copyrightability can be made, decisions in this area are
doomed to be ad hoc in nature. Judge Keeton recognized this as a prob-
lem that had been faced before, and that other courts had declined to
fashion a bright line rule for determining copyrightability. ° Keeton re-
called that even Judge Learned Hand, the creator of the famed bright-
line "BPL" test for calculating reasonable care in tort cases, was unable
to come up with a similar test for distinguishing between an idea and its
expression. 91
The Lotus opinion discusses four other concepts which highlight the
difference between the idea, noncopyrightable expressions of the idea,
and the copyrightable expressions thereof. The first of these concepts
was that of originality as defined in section 102 of the copyright law.
92
The second concept mentioned by the court was the "useful article" con-
cept which teaches that even the expression of an idea is not protected if
that expression does no more than embody the functional elements of the
idea, such as the QWERTY keyboard example cited by the court.93
The third concept helpful in distinguishing between unprotected
idea and protected expression is the concept of "obviousness." 94 By this
concept when a particular expression, does not advance beyond the obvi-
ous nature of the unprotected idea, the expression is also unprotected.
Obviousness is closely associated with the fourth concept of merger dis-
cussed by Judge Keeton. If there are only a limited number of means of
expressing an unprotected idea, then to give protection to the limited
number of expressions would in effect grant a copyright to the idea itself.
In such a case, the expression is said to "merge" with the idea, losing its
protected status.95
The second significant element in making the determination of
copyrightability identified by Judge Keeton, requires a court to make a
determination whether or not the alleged expression of the idea is limited
to elements which are essential to the expression of the idea.96 This con-
90. Id. at 60.
91. Id. (citing Judge Hand's decision in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173,
reh'g denied, 160 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1947)).
92. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
94. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 59 (D. Mass. 1990).
95. Id. (citing Morrisey v. Proctor and Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967).
96. Id. at 61.
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cept parallels the concepts of obviousness and merger identified under
the first element of copyrightability identified by Keeton. If a questioned
expression does not make use of the essential details necessary to express
the idea itself, then it will probably be copyrightable. For, as in the case
of merger, some details are so essential to the expression of an idea that
their protection would result in protection of the idea itself.97 Thus,
if the questioned expression includes elements not essential to every ex-
pression of the underlying idea, the expression is capable of being
copyrighted.
The third and final element of copyrightability identified by the Lo-
tus decision looks to the questioned expressions which are not essential
under the second element, and not merged into the idea by application of
the first element, and determines whether these expressions are a "sub-
stantial part of the allegedly copyrightable work.""8 Keeton warned that
in applying this third element of substantiality a decisionmaker must
weigh the quantitative and qualitative substance of the questioned ex-
pression, as even a quantitatively small fragment of an expression, may
be qualitatively large.99
If after applying the tests of 1)originality, functionality, obviousness,
and merger; 2)non-essential to expression of the idea; and 3)quantitative/
qualitative nature of the expression, the decisionmaker decides that the
idea and the expression are distinct, copyrightability is established ac-
cording to the Lotus test. °° By its nature, this sort of test is bound to be
ad hoc, as it requires a simultaneous weighing of many factors under the
three elements which Judge Keeton identified as relevant.
C. Application of the Three Elements of Copyrightability
to the Lotus Facts
On the court's continuum, neither the abstract "idea" of a computer
spreadsheet, nor the idea for a two-line moving cursor is copyright-
able;101 however, a particular design of a menu system incorporating
such an idea might be copyrightable. Here the court limited its inquiry
to the particular expression of computer menus to the complete expres-
sion as implemented in 1-2-3.
The idea for an electronic spreadsheet was conceived in 1978 by
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 61 (D. Mass. 1990).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 65.
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Daniel Bricklin, a frustrated MBA student who disliked performing tedi-
ous homework assignments involving repetitive mathematical calcula-
tions. Bricklin envisioned a piece of "electronic paper" which would
calculate changes to one number (such as a sum or a balance figure) as
other numbers changed, much as a person manually uses an eraser and a
pencil to update a figure on a true piece of paper. Bricklin was an exper-
ienced computer programmer and created the computer industry's first
interactive computerized spreadsheet program, "Visicalc". This pro-
gram quickly became a commercial success. Within a few years, a
number of new spreadsheets such as Supercale and Javelin, as well as
Lotus 1-2-3 reached the market offering a variety of improvements in-
cluding graphics capability, enhanced capacity, increased speed, and
greater ease of use.
10 2
Software Arts Production Development Corporation (SAPC) be-
came the copyright owner of Visicalc. For a brief period in 1980, Visi-
cale's exclusive marketing agent was Mitchell Kapor. In 1982, Kapor
left Visicale to form Lotus Development Corporation, which developed
Lotus 1-2-3. The introduction of Lotus 1-2-3 into the marketplace had a
severe, if not fatal impact on SAPC's sales of Visicalc. Visicalc consid-
ered suing Lotus Corp for copyright infringement on almost identical
claims as Lotus had against VP-Planner in the instant case. Ironically,
Visicalc decided against suit at the time because the state of computer
copyright law in 1982 had not yet reached the point where Visicalc felt it
had a reasonable probability of success on the merits.103
Three years later in 1985, SAPC sold its assets in Visicalc to Lotus.
It sold "all computer programs (in whatever form embodied or in
whatever stage of completion) ... and all trade secrets and intellectual
property embodied in, related to or underlying such computer pro-
grams." In 1988, Visicalc finally brought its copyright infringement
suit against Lotus, claiming that its sale of Visicalc to Lotus excluded a
sale of this cause of action. Visicalc commenced this action in the dis-
trict court of Massachusetts. In fact, Judge Keeton, the judge who pre-
sided over the Lotus case, heard the SAPC case. Keeton noted that as a
general rule the sale of copyrighted material does not include the right to
pursue any potential claims for infringement of that copyright. How-
ever, a narrow exception exists when all of the assets of a business are
102. Peter S. MeneHl, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs,
41 STAN. L. REv. 1045, 1057 (1989).
103. SAPC, Inc. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1009, 1011 (D. Mass. 1988).
104. Id. at 1012.
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sold in connection to that copyright."' 5 Judge Keeton ruled that when
the sale is made to alleged copyright infringer and the intention of the
parties is clearly manifested in a written agreement:
it would be unreasonable to find that Lotus acquired every other right asso-
ciated with the computer programs for VisiCalc, including the copyrights
and other intellectual property, but failed to acquire a possible claim that
the seller (SAPC) had against the buyer [Lotus] in connection with the very
same computer programs and copyrights .... To hold otherwise would
defeat the benefit of the bargain fashioned by the parties and would contra-
dict the general granting language of the Asset Purchase Agreement. 106
Lotus' acquisition of Visicalc's copyrights and computer programs with-
out limitation was a brilliant maneuver which precluded possible claims
by VP-Planner and other potential defendants on Lotus' litigation hit list
that Lotus itself had infringed the very copyright which it was attempt-
ing to enforce.
The Lotus case set a landmark by deciding that 1-2-3 could copy-
right the logical organization of a "user interface" whereby the user
presses the slash (/) key to activate a particular series of menus. The
words "Worksheet Range Copy Move File Print Graph Data System
Quit" appear at the top of the screen, with a highlighting cursor covering
the first word. As the user moves the cursor across the words, a second
line beneath these words explains what choices the user would have if he
were to select the highlighted command. For example, the user can see
that if he were to select the "Worksheet" command, he would be
presented with the following commands: "Global Insert Delete Column
Erase Titles Window Status Page." Thus, all of commands have been
organized into a consistent "tree" which presents the user with numerous
options via this two-line command system.
The Lotus court found that there are many ways to present a menu
of commands in a computer program and that therefore 1-2-3's expres-
sion of its menu did not "merge" with the unprotected idea of the elec-
tronic spreadsheet. 107 To illustrate this point, the court noted that
Microsoft's Excel uses a very different menu-command hierarchy via a
system of "pull-down" menus, quite unlike 1-2-3's two-line moving cur-
sor system. The court also pointed out that there is virtually an unlim-
ited number of ways to implement even two-line moving cursor systems.
The court cited the very first spreadsheet program, VisiCalc, which used
105. Id. at 1012.
106. Id. at 1015.
107. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 67 (D. Mass. 1990).
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a main command line reading "Command: BCDEGIMPRSTVW," indi-
cating in alphabetic order the first letter of each top-level command. In
contrast, 1-2-3 uses a command line containing the full word for each
top-level command, and these words are placed in order of frequency of
probable use, rather than in alphabetic order.
After determining that some of Lotus 1-2-3's nonliteral elements
were not merged into the idea of an electronic spreadsheet, the Lotus
court also broke new ground by deciding that some of 1-2-3's nonliteral
elements were merged, and therefore not copyrightable. Reiterating
Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble, the court held that when only a limited
number of forms of expression of an idea exist, granting a copyright
would improperly allow appropriation of the whole subject matter. Mor-
rissey stated that "to permit copyrighting would mean that a party or
parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all pos-
sibilities of future use of the substance."' 1 8 Morrissey further concluded
that "[w]e can not recognize copyright as a game of chess in which the
public can be checkmated."' 109
Thus, the Lotus court held that 1-2-3 could not copyright its expres-
sion of a spreadsheet as an "L" rotated 90 degrees clockwise with letters
across the top to designate columns and numbers down the side to desig-
nate rows. 10 The court took judicial notice that as a factual matter,
there are limited ways to make a computer screen resemble a grid-like
paper spreadsheet."'1 In addition, the court held that with only a limited
number of keys on a computer keyboard, some designations of specific
meanings for specific keys can not be copyrighted. For example, 1-2-3
could not copyright the designation of the slash key as the key used to
invoke the menu system. The reason for this being that as a practical
matter very few keys are left unassigned after eliminating the keys
needed to express mathematical formulas or words.112 Furthermore, in a
rare concession to the average user, the court found that a user should
not be required to press two keys at the same time to invoke a menu
(such as "Shift," "Alt," or "Ctrl" along with another key). Additionally,
the court found that the "+" key, the "-" key, the "*" key, or the ""
key could not earn copyright protection as representing the functions of
108. Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967).
109. Id. at 679.
110. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 66.
111. Id.
112. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 66 (D. Mass. 1990).
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addition, subtraction, multiplication, or division (respectively), since
each of these is essential to every presentation of a spreadsheet.
In examining the "substantiality" of the copied elements, both quali-
tatively and quantitatively to determine whether they represented a sub-
stantial part of the work the court decided that the structure, sequence,
and organization of 1-2-3's menu system was the work's most unique
element, attested to by the defendant's taking the trouble to copy it.
Thus, the court determined that as an "incontrovertibly" substantial part
of the work, 1-2-3's user interface was copyrightable. 113  After simulta-
neously weighing the abstract definition of the idea involved in the pres-
ent litigation (the electronic spreadsheet) with the doctrines of merger,
obviousness, functionality, originality, "nonessential-ness," and substan-
tiality, Judge Keeton came to the conclusion that there were indeed some
copyrightable nonliteral elements present in 1-2-3, such as the' menu hier-
archy and two-line moving cursor system. Other contested nonliteral ex-
pressions of the electronic spreadsheet such as the rotated "L" format,
were merged with the idea, and therefore not copyrightable.
D. Lotus Court Rejects Paperback Software's Policy Arguments
VP-Planner was rewritten so that each command would begin the
same first letter as a 1-2-3 command, and every command was relocated
to achieve the same position in the menu hierarchy as 1-2-3. Defendant
argued that it did this in order to achieve compatibility with 1-2-3's
Macro Programming Language, rather than to copy the visual displays
themselves. The Keyboard Macro Language "memorizes" a series of
keystrokes as a user traverses down the command tree and then later
plays them back to automatically perform a series of operations.
Although the Macro Language contains additional commands not found
on the main menu system, it primarily incorporates a duplicate of the
entire menu command hierarchy.114
Defendant argued that since languages are not copyrightable even if
original, its copying of 1-2-3's command menu structure was permissible.
A language, even computer language, can not be copyrightable in either
words or syntax because this would be tantamount to granting someone
ownership of French or Russian (even though expressions in any of these
languages are themselves copyrightable).115 The general rule is that a
113. Id. at 68.
114. Id. at 68-69.
115. Because 1-2-3 might be able to copyright keystroke sequences in its macro language, corpo-
rate 1-2-3 users worry that an attempt by Lotus to extend its copyright to customer-written macros
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computer language may be freely used even for commercial profit with-
out the permission of the language developer. (However, permission is
required to distribute the often necessary computer program which
translates that language from human-readable into computer-readable
form). 116
Essentially, Paperback Software maintained that it had no choice
but to borrow 1-2-3's menu structure and macro command facility for
their "utilitarian" language aspect rather than for their "artistic" as-
pects. 1 7 The court found this language argument to be "totally without
merit."'118 First, the court pointed out that other programs incompatible
with 1-2-3 have been commercial successes without copying 1-2-3's com-
mands and menus exactly.119 Second, it was pointed out that copying
was not the only way to achieve desired compatibility with the 1-2-3
macro language. VP-Planner could have created a program to translate
1-2-3 macros into VP-Planner's own macro language, as Microsoft Excel
had done. Even Lotus itself had created a "macro conversion utility" to
translate macros among its different language versions (English, French,
German, Italian, Spanish, Swedish). 121 The court rebuffed the argument
that writing such a conversion program "would have been an extremely
complicated task" as a reason for denial of 1-2-3 copyright protection. 121
Interestingly, the Lotus court refused to be directly drawn into de-
ciding the difference between a "language," which is not copyrightable,
and a "set of instructions," which is defined by section 101 of the Copy-
right Act as being inherently copyrightable. Although elsewhere the
court relied upon strict statutory construction to enforce legislative man-
dates even where such mandates did not answer the questions of law at
hand,122 here the court held that defendant's argument was a "word
game" which obstructed the court's decisionmaking by changing the
could prevent them from continuing to use the complex 1-2-3 macros they've developed over the
years. Barbara Darrow, Lotus Litigation Sparks Corporate Resentment, INFoNVORLD, Sep. 3, 1990 at
46.
116. This translation program is called a "compiler" or an "interpreter," and is in itself copy-
rightable. SALONE, supra note 11, at ch. 4, p.4 8 .
117. Defendant could have cited Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980)
(finding permissible copying of the mechanical operation of Walt Disney character children's toys,
since such operation is a utilitarian aspect of the toys and defendant's toys were entirely different in
"decoration").
118. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 73 (D. Mass. 1990).
119. Id. at 69.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 78.
122. Id. at 71.
[Vol. 40
LOTUS LITIGATION
meanings of these words at different points in its argument.123 The court
failed to clearly distinguish whether 1-2-3 was a language or a computer
program under the statute. Rather, the court seemed to use equity doc-
trine to hold that under either interpretation, defendant was not free to
copy because it could have acquired access to the 1-2-3 menu via licens-
ing, via an offer to sell its new expression of ideas to Lotus, or via market-
ing its product as an "add-in" to be used alongside rather than instead of
LotUS.124
The Lotus court disregarded expert testimony and law review arti-
cles 125 proffered by the defendants in its consideration of the facts and in
reaching its conclusions. 126 The court even rejected as irrelevant the tes-
timony of Dan Bricklin, the inventor of electronic spreadsheets, which
urged against copyright status for non-literal elements. The court felt
that it lacked the authority to recast copyright laws in a new light, even if
those laws had become "old statutes" by being exposed to circumstances
materially different from those existing when the statutes were en-
acted. 127 The court concluded that it would be going well beyond prece-
dent if it took into account testimony of computer software development
experts which was "manifestly inconsistent with the accommodation that
Congress struck when it enacted the Copyright Act of 1976" and its
amendments. 28 The court reasoned that when it enacted these laws,
Congress had already evaluated these concerns and manifested an inten-
tion to encourage computer programming innovation via copyright pro-
tection despite academic criticism, despite proposals to protect only the
literal expressions, and despite expert testimony warning of disastrous
consequences. The court noted that such horribles have not occurred.
In fact, user interfaces have becbme more expressive and more communi-
cative under the congressional mandate of the 1976 Act and its 1980
amendments. 129
The defendant pointed out that software developers desire a bright-
line rule to distinguish between permissible and non-permissible copying
123. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 72 (D. Mass. 1990).
124. Id. at 78.
125. For these theories, see Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copy-
right Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARv. L. REv. 281 (1970); Samuelson &
Glushko, supra note 65, at 121; A. CLAPES, SoFTWARE, COPYRIGHT & COMPETrION: THE "LOOK
AND FEEL" OF THE LAW (1989).
126. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 74.
127. Defendants "have asked the court to consider policy arguments as freely as if the court
were under no constraints in this respect." Id. at 74.
128. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 76 (D. Mass. 1990).
129. It at 76-77.
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of non-literal elements of other programs. Without such a rule software
writers have no clear way of knowing whether their creations violate or
do not violate another's copyright. Thus, many software experts have
proposed a bright-line rule which protects only literal software code, but
does not protect non-literal expressions.
The court noted that Congress could have drawn a bright-line rule if
it had chosen to do so, since these issues were before Congress when it
wrote the 1976 Copyright Act and Amendments.130 However, since
Congress has not done so, the court believed that it would be abusing its
authority by judicially creating such a rule.1 31 Instead, the court fell
back upon Judge Learned Hand's often reiterated argument that copy-
right violation decisions can only be made on an ad hoe basis. Judge
Hand refused to create a bright-line formula for distinguishing between
permissive copying of an idea and impermissible borrowing of
expression. 132
E. Lotus Decision Will Protect Creation of User-Friendly Interfaces
Although programmers create computer programs to perform spe-
cific work, the programmer's task in writing the instructions necessary to
perform that work are often dwarfed by the crushing complexity of writ-
ing instructions which perform the simple expedient of communicating
and interacting with a human user. A program can only be commer-
cially successful when its design is centered around the people who will
be using it. The programmer must shape the structure of the finished
computer program product to meet users' needs, abilities, limitations,
and work environments. 33 "User friendly" programs can meet users'
needs by achieving the goals of (1) minimizing user learning time, (2)
maximizing performance speed, (3) minimizing the rate of user errors,
(4) maximizing user satisfaction, and (5) maximizing user retention of
knowledge over time.
34
Large software companies achieve these goals by investing large
sums of research time and money in user studies. Apple Computer, for
example, established a "Human Interface Laboratory" to systematically
test different designs of visual presentation schemes, color, sounds, and
130. Id. at 73.
131. Id
132. Id. at 60 (citing Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487,489 (2d Cir.
1960)).
133. Peter S. MeneU, supra note 102, at 1052-53.
134. Id. at 1054.
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input/output devices. This laboratory measures aesthetic, psychologi-
cal, and ergonometric factors via user responses to interviews, question-
naires, and performance metrics (such as speed and accuracy measures).
The results of these studies are used to modify future additions and
changes to the software on Apple computers.
135
This philosophy is also mirrored by Lotus Development Corpora-
tion's own written statement to the U.S. Copyright Office:
The user never sees the code. He or she couldn't care less whether it is in
one computer language or another, or how it is expressed in the computer
language it employs. All that user [sic] cares about is how he or she can use
and interface with the program, with how the program operates and what it
does for the user .... Well written code enables a program to run quickly,
efficiently and reliably - all potentially important to a user.
136
The Lotus court recognized the importance of this investment of
human ergonomic research, stating that the
bulk of the creative work is in the conceptualization of a computer program
and its user interface, rather than in its encoding, and that creating a suita-
ble user interface is a more difficult task, requiring greater creativity, origi-
nality, and insight, than converting the user interface design into
instructions to the machine.
137
Not only are user interfaces difficult to program, but the demand for
good interfaces is intense. Perhaps inspired by 1-2-3's success,
"[n]owadays users expect their software to have moving bar menus as an
integral part of the interface to the program." 
1 38
Experienced programmers know that friendly application programs permit
the user to pick from a list of items .... This kind of interface usually is
implemented with a "point and shoot" style: a window pops up, and the list
of items to be selected from scrolls in the window using a highlighted mov-
ing bar.... Normally this kind of interface requires quite a bit of program-
ming on the part of the software author.
139
The Lotus decision will protect a writer's investment of time and money
in developing a popular and easy to use interface.
135. Id. at 1054-55.
136. Id. at 1056 n.56 (quoting the testimony of Thomas Lemberg, Vice President and General
Counsel, and Ed Belove, Vice President, Research and Development, Lotus Development Corpora-
tion, before the U.S. Copyright Office (Sept. 9, 1987)).
137. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 56 (D. Mass. 1990).
138. SOFTWARE SCIENCE, INC., TOPAZ VERSION 2.8 USER'S GUIDE AND REFERENCE MAN-
UAL 68 (1990).




It has been suggested that offering inventors copyright monopoly
protection is unnecessary due to the inherent "head-start" lead time ad-
vantage of being the first in the marketplace. 4 Combined with trade
secret protection, a copyright monopoly may even be detrimental to soci-
ety by unnecessarily retarding innovation by others.
1 41
However, the software industry marketplace is unlike that of other
markets. It has a very short "turn-around-time" between production
and release of "copied" expressions of ideas. Additionally, the actual
cost of production and distribution is minimal for both for original and
for stolen work, since computer disks and data are fungible. Yet, the
software industry suffers from a very long research and development
phase required to create new original products. In fact, some industry
critics complain that software development is years behind that of the
computer hardware which is capable of running the software.
Moreover, software inventors probably can not take advantage of
this "head-start" phenomenon due to what I call the "penguin effect."
Few software users want to be the first to try any new product. Like
penguins, users often prefer to let their compatriots jump into the water
first to determine whether it is infested by sharks. For this reason, the
version numbers "xx.O" on software are almost anathema, because no
one wants to be the initial user confronted with software problems which
will eventually be fixed and re-released in version "xx.l."
Software inventors probably can not take advantage of the "head-
start" phenomenon because most software does not become profitable
until it becomes the industry standard. By the time an inventor begins to
reap the benefits, the "head-start" period is over, and competitors have
already begun nipping at the heels with similar products. The competi-
tors have the advantage of seeing what works and what does not work,
without first risking anything.
Some analysts have discovered a "prospecting" function to inven-
tion, and have argued that similar protection should be given to copy-
right claimants as mineral rights protections are given to prospectors. 142
140. Oddi, supra note 39, at 1108.
141. Id. at 1116.
142. Id. at 1111, citing Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
166, 171 (1948) (noting similarity between Venetian patent practice and mineral grants). See also,
Edward W. Kitch, Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus: A Reply, 23 J. LAW & ECON. 205, 205
(1980); Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on In-
novation, 76 CAL. L. Rav. 803, 838-42 (1988) (analyzing prospect theory).
[Vol. 40
LOTUS LITIGATION
Mineral rights grants often justify a grant of a very large zone reserved
for the exclusive use of the grantee on the basis of the heavy investment
required to operate the claim. Similarly, the heavy investment of re-
search and development in "prospecting" a new computer program
could justify the wide-ranged copyright grant by providing a wide berth
between the claimant and its neighboring competitors.
One argument against such copyright monopolies is that they create
an unproductive social cost. Monopolies force competitors to waste re-
search resources by "inventing around" the copyright in order to find
non-infringing ways of gaining similar results. The industry as a whole
would waste research time which could instead be devoted to attacking
unsolved problems.
143
However, this argument does not hold true in the software industry
due to its unique nature. It may be inexpensive for the software industry
to create a "working around" product, since there are numerous ways
produce similar but not completely identical screens. Further, the effort
devoted to the workarounds might not be a "waste," since it is likely to
uncover equally valid and useful ways of operating the software."
Choice among different ways of using a program is valuable in its own
right. Even though many columnists complain about lack of standardi-
zation, this array of different programs (i.e., pull down menus, little
icons, the daunting "C:" prompt) allows each user to find the level which
fits his own needs. Standardization is also a reduction to the lowest com-
mon denominator, which in its own right stifles creativity.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Another approach to protecting software rights is the route of pat-
ent law, rather than its distinct cousin copyright law. Both patent and
copyright grants share their genesis in the Writings and Discoveries
Clause. However, the purpose of patent law is to protect inventions,
rather than mere expression of ideas. Patent law protects inventions
which are new, useful, non-obvious and which are within four statutory
143. Oddi, supra note 39, at 1113 (citing Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive
Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 454-55 (1969)).
144. See id. at 1115-16 (arguing that forced investment of research time into solving one prob-
lem often yields the social benefit of "serendipitous or spin-off inventions, in which an investment
directed toward a particular problem yields an unexpected solution to another problem"). See also
id. at 1116 n.l 13 (examples of colossal serendipitous discoveries and inventions include: X-rays,
penicillin, vulcanization of rubber, the phonograph record player, the Bessemer steel making pro-
cess, the photographic process, dynamite, and the discovery of allergies).
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classes: process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. 145 A
patent grants to an inventor the legal right to prevent others from com-
mercially exploiting his invention for 17 years, in exchange for his releas-
ing the invention to the world at the end of that exclusive period.
146
Patent theory has a significant advantage over copyright theory. A
single consistent court rules on all patent stilts, thus avoiding the multi-
tude of differing opinions and the ensuing uncertainty which results from
the review of copyright law by the Federal Courts of Appeal. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFO) has been the main en-
forcer of federal patent law since 1983.
Generally, courts have been reluctant to apply patent law to com-
puter software. For example, the Supreme Court refused to apply patent
law protection to mathematical formulae and algorithms, as urged by the
Patent Office. In Gottschalk v. Benson, 47 the court disallowed patent
protection for a particular mathematical formula which could only be
practically used in connection with a particular computer hardware sys-
tem. Similarly, in Parker v. Flood, 14 the court affirmed a decision that a
computer algorithm even for a very specific purpose was not patentable.
However, the line between patentable computer hardware and copy-
rightable computer software is difficult to discern. Computer technology
has so blurred the difference between intellectual property (valuable in-
formation) and physical property (nuts and bolts) that what were tradi-
tionally thought to be physical objects have transcended their physicality
and become so charged with information that we have to disregard
"what they are" and look primarily at "what they do."' 4 9
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984150 expressed Con-
gress' view that even though hardware is normally protected by patent
law, the software information which is permanently and physically
burned into Read Only Memory (ROM) chips, is copyrightable to the
extent that copying the chip is an infringement of the copyright holder's
protections.
Furthermore, in Gottschalk the Supreme Court emphasized that its
decision was a narrow decision, that although the Court did not allow
patent protection for the software in this particular case, the Court did
145. Id. at 1117.
146. Brett Glass, Patently Unfair?, INFoWoRLD, Oct. 29, 1990, at 56.
147. 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).
148. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
149. SALONE, supra note 11, at ch.1, p.8.
150. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347, 17 U.S.C.
§ 901 et. seq. (Supp. 1991).
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not preclude the patentability of computer programs in all cases. In Dia-
mond v. Diehr'5 1 and Diamond v. Bradley,i5 2 the Court held that since
processes are protected by patent law, a process which incorporated a
computer program or algorithm could be patentable, even if the al-
gorithm by itself could not. 53
These recent rulings leave the door open for an inventor to design a
special purpose computer to execute an algorithm he wants to protect,
and then obtain a patent on the machine. The inventor could make his
patent claim broad enough to include any other machine which uses the
same algorithm. Then the inventor could assert that any other machine
which uses the same algorithm will infringe on the patent.1 5 4 However,
this method of patenting software via patenting the machine which runs
the software is inapplicable to the Lotus suit, since Lotus is designed to
work on standard IBM PC computers.
Patent law protects new and useful processes and new and useful
improvements. An enormous problem rears its head when applying
these patent law principles to computer programs and computer algo-
rithms,15  since perhaps more than in any other field, progress in com-
puter programming depends upon building upon and adding
improvements to the work of predecessors.
In computer programming, originality is extremely difficult to define.
Many thousands of computer programs owe their sorting algorithms to the
efforts of half a dozen men.
There's another level to this, the most superficial but perhaps the most
important. This is the look and feel of the software. What should a pro-
gram look like? What should its command and their representation be?
I point all this out simply to say that I make no claims to complete
originality for the code in this book. Precisely-the opposite, in fact. The
code was written under the influence of some great software.
If you're going to steal, steal from the best. Take the pieces and solve
problems with them. As for the routines in this book, nothing would please
me more than seeing them in widespread use.
56
151. 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (finding patentability in a process for operating a machine which uti-
lized a computer program for solving a formula).
152. 445 U.S. 926 (1980), cert granted in tandem with Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
153. Glass, supra note 146, at 58.
154. Id. at 53.
155. An "algorithm" is a procedure or method embodied in a series of computer instructions by
which a desired computation, action, or result may be achieved.
156. FULLER, supra note 32 at xxix.
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Furthermore, even when software is not influenced by the work which
preceded it, there exists an enormous problem of independent re-inven-
tion. Should patent law be applied to computer programming to any
substantial degree, independent re-invention suits may completely over-
whelm the courts. Patent law grants sole rights to the first registered
inventor of a process idea, to the exclusion of all other inventors who
independently re-invent the same concept. However, independent re-in-
vention abounds in the field of computer programming, so much so that
it seems unlikely that much new software could be written without unin-
tentionally tripping over the previously patented processes of others.
Many predict that applying patent law to computer programming will
stifle invention.157 Copyright law seems to offer a more sensible match to
the realities of software creation than does patent law, since it protects
any author who creates any expression through their own exertion, re-
gardless of how many other authors have created similar expressions
from their own toil. If the goal of applying patent law to computer pro-
grams is to provide more certainty in a creator's rights, or is to reduce
the volume of litigation (as compared to copyright litigation), it is highly
questionable that it will succeed in doing so.
Patent law is an imperfect method to protect computer programs
since the only applications of ideas which can be patented are those
which are not "obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains."'
158
Thomas Jefferson originated this standard (he also authored the 1793
Patent Act) while serving on the Patent Board, primarily to prevent
wasting his valuable time reviewing patent applications for obvious, un-
important, and trivial inventions.15 9 The Lotus court recognized that a
non-obvious standard could hinder progress in computer programming
because innovation in computer programming is advanced as each
programmer builds upon the ideas of previous programmers who came
before. 160
Computer programs are not merely forms of writing, they are also
products. The Lotus court hinted at trademark concepts when it noted
157. See Guy Kewney, The Enemy of Invention; Guy Kewney Reports on American Computer
Programmers' Fears About the Use of Patent Law, THE INDEPENDENT, Aug. 13, 1990, at 13 (con-
trasting the traditional use of copyright law with patent law in regard to computer programs).
158. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1989).
159. See Oddi, supra note 39, at 1123 & n.155.
160. See generally Dennis S. Karijala, Lessons From the Computer Software Protection Debate in
Japan, 1984 ARiz. ST. L.J. 53, 67, 68 (noting that "many new programs are developed through
improvements or additions to existing programs").
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that "a user could easily think 1-2-3 rather than VP-Planner was the
program in use."'161 Trademark theory as applied to computer software
would seek to avoid consumer confusion caused by leading the public to
falsely believe it was using one product rather than a substitute meant to
copy the original. The Lotus court noted that such confusion could exist
in the realm of computer programs, where "[c]ertainly purchasers of a
book designed to teach users how to master 1-2-3, which is distributed
with demonstration versions of VP-Planner, would be likely to overlook
the disparities between 1-2-3 and VP-Planner."' 62 If a programmer can
claim that his style of program presentation is identifiable to the minds of
the public as his trademark, he might gain the eternal protection of
trademark law rather than the mere lifetime + 50 year protection offered
by copyright law.' 63 It presents an interesting question whether one
might register a trademark on the visual representation of a menu struc-
ture as a means of identifying its origin to prevent others from producing
imitation software designed to fool the consumer.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Lotus case set several landmarks. It rejected the "look and
feel" test for software copyrightability, instead imposing a test which
might reasonably be called a 3-part conceptualization/merger/substanti-
ality test. This test appears to be flexible enough to be applied to a vari-
ety of computer copyright cases, but it remains to be seen whether this
test will gain widespread acceptance by other courts. The case also set a
landmark by rejecting the extremist views that computer programs are
either entirely copyrightable or entirely non-copyrightable. Rather, the
Lotus test divides each computer program into separate expressive ele-
ments, then evaluates them to determine which are independently copy-
rightable and which are not. The court set further precedent by refusing
to create a bright-line test of software copyrightability, maintaining in-
stead that cases must be decided on an ad hoe basis. The decision reaf-
161. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 70 (D. Mass. 1990).
162. Rd
163. Although, one might conclude that in today's rapidly changing technological environment,
even 50 years of protection should be more than sufficient to outlast the likely use of the program
(assuming that the programmer should die immediately after the fixation of the idea), such a suppo-
sition might dangerously abrogate authors' rights. A line of derivative works of such a creation
might well extend beyond 50 years, and the trend of cases today as exemplified by Ashton-Tate v.
Fox 760 F. Supp. 231 (C.D. Cal. 1990) indicates that derivative works may soon be the most hotly
contested application of computer copyright law, at least until Congress revises the copyright stat-
utes to more directly address the problem.
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firms structure/sequence/organization reasoning to protect software, but
does so by returning to fundamental idea-expression distinctions, rather
than sweeping "look and feel" reasoning. Although this decision has re-
ceived much attention in the software industry, the lack of binding effect
upon other courts leads many to embrace a "wait and see" attitude until
the U.S. Supreme Court or Congress speaks more clearly on this impor-
tant issue. 164
The most notable legacy of the Lotus case is its reaffirmation of the
copyright law as a means of protecting computer software. The case rec-
ognizes that creating a user interface is often the most arduous task asked
of a computer programmer. 16' Lotus Corporation used this case to
reconfirm a notion repeatedly proved by Apple Computer that copyright
law can be used as a powerful shield to recover from a failure to innovate
in the lab, if only by indirectly scaring away customers who might other-
wise commit to products superior to or cheaper than Lotus' own.
166
However, the pro-litigation effect of this case is somewhat counterbal-
anced by the recent Ashton-Tate v. Fox Software case which invalidated
that plaintiff's copyright completely on grounds which were not even
raised by defendant.1 67 Such a decision obviously serves as a strong dis-
incentive against infringement victims from bringing their cases to
court. 
16 8
Secondarily, reaction by the computer programming community
against this decision has been strong because the "precedent set by the
Lotus behemoth is scaring independent programmers to death."'' 69 A
group known as the League for Programming Freedom, headed by mav-
erick programmer and MacArthur Foundation grant winner Richard
Stallman, held a protest outside Lotus Development Corporation's Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts headquarters, advocating an open, non-proprie-
tary system of freely sharing programming information so that
programmers may constantly improve the public's programming.
170
164. Lotus Decision Extends Copyright Law; Menu Structure and User Interface Are Protectable,
Judge Rules, INFOWORLD, Jul. 9, 1990, at 85.
165. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 56.
166. Jim Seymour, Lotus v. Borland Upshot. Customer Intimidation, PC WK, Jul. 23, 1990, at
15 [hereinafter Seymour, Customer Initimidation].
167. Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Fox Software, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 831 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
168. But see Xerox Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 1542, 1549 (N.D. Cal. 1990)
(presuming that Congress did not intend for courts to be in the business of canceling copyrights).
169. Sheldon L. Richman, Programming Freedom is New Group's Objective, WASH. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 1990, at C2.
170. Lou Dolinar, Programming Freedom, NEWSDAY, Aug. 7, 1990, at 3. See also Dana Ken-
nedy, MIT 'Genius' Leads Free Software Drive, CHI. TRia., July 29, 1990, § 7; Programmers Picket
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Others in the industry have speculated that this decision will have a
likely chilling effect upon the production of any new software competi-
tive with programs successful enough to be likely to litigate. The genesis
of new software creation will be warped under the "diligent cleanroom
procedures" necessarily enforced to maintain a viable defense to looming
infringement litigation.
1 71
Lotus Corporation's competitors argue that this suit will be detri-
mental to the software industry as a whole. Says PhiUipe Kahn, of Bor-
land International, which produces the best-selling spreadsheet program
Quattro Pro next on Lotus' lawsuit chopping block, "[t]hey're trying to
stop us in the court of law rather than by building a better product. Why
can't they just compete in the marketplace?" 172 Lotus vice president
Tom Lemberg responds that copyright litigation is beneficial to the in-
dustry, for without such protection 1-2-3 might never have survived long
enough to become an industry standard. Lemberg adds that "Lotus is
now a big company. But in 1983, without copyright protection, there
would have been nothing to stop a big company from expropriating our
work." 
173
While the Lotus case fulfilled its mandate under the Supreme
Court's decision in Kelly, it also has failed to remedy the problem. Judge
Keeton has been accused of failing to understand how the software in-
dustry works or how computers are used in business. 74 By refusing to
set forth a bright-line rule which would allow a developer to know
whether a slightly different implementation of an interface would violate
1-2-3's copyright protection (at least until suit is actually brought and
decided), the court will cast a "chilling effect" upon the advancement
and development of the software industry. Xerox Corporation pointed
out the lack of a bright-line rule caused it to lose many potential custom-
ers, who hesitated acquiring its MacIntosh-like Star 8010 Professional
Workstation because they feared that they might be sued for infringe-
ment by Apple, even though Xerox had a strong claim to the interface,
Lotus; League for Programming Freedom Protests Lotus Development Corp.'s Litigation Activities,
MACWEEK Aug. 14, 1990, at 85.
171. Fred M. Greguras, Implications of the Lotus 1-2-3 Copyright Infringement Decision, 11
COMPUTER L. REP. 749, 751 (July 1990).
172. Richard Landry, Risky Business, PC WORLD, Sept. 1990, at 15 (quoting Phillipe Kahn).
173. Id. (quoting Tom Lemberg).
174. Jim Seymour, Victory Spurs Lotus to Take-No-Prisoners Campaign; Lotus Development




and Apple had not yet initiated such suits. 175
Ironically, the Lotus court's failure to create a bright-line rule could
present an obstacle for its next lawsuit, Lotus v. Borland International,
filed the day after Lotus succeeded in the instant lawsuit. Borland's
product, Quattro Pro, does not come automatically configured to a Lo-
tus-like interface, rather the user must take the initiative to activate
Quattro's optional ability to mimic 1-2-3's keystrokes and menus.
1 76
Lacking a bright-line rule, it is unclear whether users' affirmative activa-
tion of lookalike features is enough of a substantial difference to avoid
copyright violation. Furthermore, Quattro's workalike menus use the
same sequence as 1-2-3's menus, but the menus do not look identical to 1-
2-3's menus, as did VP-Planner's menus in the instant case. Quattro's
menus utilize drop-down windows and daughter windows which many
users find superior to 1-2-3's one-line menu options. 177 Although the Lo-
tus decision boils down to the fact that the logical organization of a menu
structure is copyrightable apart from its graphic representation of that
menu on the display screen, lacking a bright-line rule, it remains unclear
whether a different graphic representation of the same logical organiza-
tion would also violate such a copyright.
1 78
The Lotus v. Borland suit could result in a fascinating split between
rulings in the California and Massachusetts federal courts. Borland sued
in a California federal court requesting a declaration that they had not
violated Lotus' property rights. On the same day that Lotus filed its own
action in a Boston federal court.' 79 Should this suit be heard in Califor-
nia, Lotus will be unable to rely on the Massachusetts' District Court
precedent except for persuasive effect. Borland could rely upon a Cali-
fornia suit apparently presenting a bright-line rule directly in conflict
with Lotus. Ashton-Tate v. Ross held that a handwritten list of labels for
user commands was not protected by copyright because many of these
commands were already commonly.available in other software programs,
and furthermore the list did not contain any source code.180 Ross created
175. Xerox Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 734 F.Supp. 1542, 1546 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
176. Note that the name "Quattro" is a play on words of the name "1-2-3." Quattro means
"four" in Spanish, indicating that it is the next advancement in the series or that it represents the
next generation of spreadsheet programs.
177. Seymour, No Prisoners, supra note 174, at 12.
178. Lotus Decision Extends Copyright Law; Menu Structure and User Interface Are Protectable
Judge Rules, INFoWoRLD, Jul. 9, 1990, at 85 (quoting Ron Laurie, intellectual property lawyer at
Irell & Manella, in Menlo Park, California).
179. Seymour, Customer Intimidation, supra note 166 at 15.
180. Ashton-Tate v. Ross, 728 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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a bright-line rule that a "list of commands is only an idea that is not
protected by federal [copyright] law."' 81  Ultimately, in either court-
room, the Borland suit will probably be decided based upon the real un-
derlying issue of whether or not Quattro captured 1-2-3's economic
value, regardless of whether the court's espoused vehicle is the Ashton-
Tate bright-line rule or is the Lotus ad-hoc discretion rule." 2
181. Ross, 728 F. Supp. at 602.
182. Steven Burke, 'Hacker Extraordinaire' Protests Interface Monopolies Richard Stallman
Hopes MacArthur Grant Will Lend Credibility to Cause, PC Wx, Jul. 23, 1990, at 136.
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